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non-*S*. And this is no more of a contradiction than to say that John is tall as compared with William, but short as compared with Henry.²

The "hypothesis of distribution" does not, then, "break down" in the case of the partial inverse; for in this case the rule of distribution is simply irrelevant. Whatever may be said of the pedagogical difficulties encountered in dealing with the notion of distribution, and of the advantages and disadvantages of other methods of exposition, the rules of distribution need not involve us in contradiction. All that is necessary is to reformulate them in accordance with a more accurate definition. The rule for conversion will then become: *No term of the converse may be distributed with respect to the other term unless it was distributed with respect to the same term in the convertend.* And the rules for the categorical syllogism may be expressed after this fashion: *The middle term must be distributed with respect to at least one of the other terms of the syllogism; while Neither term of the conclusion may be distributed with respect to the other, unless in the premise in which it appears it is distributed with respect to the middle term.*

The essential point of the proposed formulation is recognition of the relativity of distribution. If distribution is defined as a relative concept, the rules are necessarily more complicated than those to which we are accustomed. For most purposes, however, the rules ordinarily given will be found sufficiently precise, and they may be considered as approximations to the more adequate formulations suggested above.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

An Examination of William James's Philosophy. J. E. TURNER.
Oxford: B. H. Blackwell. 1919. Pp. 76.

In this little book we behold William James quoted against himself, a spectacle which Mr. Turner considers quite damaging to the reputation of a philosopher, but which probably would not worry James so much. Sometimes, I think, the inconsistencies are unduly sharpened, as in the criticism of the lecture on "Pragmatism and Common Sense." Occasionally Mr. Turner takes James's language too strictly, thus using the style, which he praises for making philosophy popular, against its author. In the main, however, the ap-

² This is substantially the solution suggested by Keynes. See *Formal Logic*, p. 107.

parent contradictions to which he points are unmistakably in the text. James would probably have pleaded guilty to most of these charges, but would have declined to be measured by Mr. Turner's standard, for the two men disagree rather fundamentally as to the nature and limitations of philosophy. James sought "a fresh perception every day," and was not in great haste to adjust these to one another. Mr. Turner, however, demands of philosophy first of all that it be consistent, and as he has no difficulty in finding contradictions in James's work, he believes it to be superficial rather than profound. James held that "no philosophy can ever be anything but a summary sketch, a picture of the world in abridgment, a foreshortened bird's-eye view of the perspective of events," and Mr. Turner "thinks we find in this characterization of philosophy the essential defect of James's whole general position." "Had James risen above what we believe must in truth be called this very superficial view of the real nature of philosophy, his treatment of its problems would surely have been more fruitful and final. . . . Philosophy deals not with facts and events merely as such, but with their underlying and determining principles, with a rationale, however vague and inadequate of the universe in its infinity." James takes philosophy somewhat too lightly, and his treatment of its problems has led many into confusions, so that "the tendency of his teaching, taken as a whole and in the long run, is not 'on the side of the angels.' "

This difference in opinion as to the nature of philosophy appears most clearly in Mr. Turner's criticism of James's theory of truth. He distinguishes between the identification of true theories and the explanation of their truth. Identification is simply a matter of empirical observation; explanation alone concerns philosophy. Mr. Turner admits that pragmatism shows us a way of identifying true theories, at least the "meaner kind," for "if a theory works (in the long run) it is true." But this does not imply that "because a theory works, therefore it is true." The real problem for philosophy arises only when we ask the question "why a true theory works," and to explain this is "always a matter of distinctly rational thought, not discoverable from experience and experiment."

This distinction between identification and explanation is an important one, but Mr. Turner's own account of truth seems to me less adequate than James's to explain the fact that a true theory works. In his view "Truth is the harmony, the internal agreement of the system of conceptions and ideas which our thinking gives us." He criticizes James for not considering this coherence theory of truth at all. But just as Mr. Turner admits that true theories work in

the long run, so James admits that in a science the various principles must be somehow adjusted to one another. And again, just as Mr. Turner claims that the working of a theory is not the cause of its truth, may not James reply that the consistency of principles with one another is not the cause of their truth? In brief, does not Mr. Turner's definition give us simply another way of identifying true theories rather than an explanation of them?

The fact is that no definition of truth "explains" it; for an explanation, we must go beyond the thing to its setting and conditions. This Mr. Turner admits. If James were asked why a true theory works, he would undoubtedly answer because it agrees with reality, though he would also insist on interpreting this "agreement" in his own way. He would say the theory agrees with reality not in the sense that it "looks like" reality, but in the sense that it can be used in real life. Mr. Turner, however, rejects any correspondence theory, and shuts himself up within the circle of "the coherent system of conceptions which thinking gives us." This last clause "which thinking gives us" leaves Mr. Turner a way of escape which may however involve the abandonment of his position. He admits that the "conditions of thought in themselves form an absolutely essential element of the problem, though they are never the only element." But the whole question turns on the proper description of these "conditions of thought." The essence of the pragmatic position is to take issue with the older correspondence theory's description of thought as making a picture of reality, and to insist that it is rather a dealing with reality. I believe that Mr. Turner cuts himself off from the correspondence theory so completely because he interprets it as necessarily implying that thought is making a picture of reality. Otherwise he might have turned to a sentence of Mr. Bradley's, whom he is so fond of quoting, "The truth and the fact, which to be converted in the Absolute, would require less re-arrangement and addition, is more real and truer." Could not this be entered in the field as one of the rival solutions of the real problem which is, in James's words, to tell "what may precisely be meant by the term 'agreement' "? Of course, it has the disadvantage of being, as Mr. Bradley himself says, "impossible to handle."

The fact that Mr. Turner and James select different qualities of truth as the surest marks of identification is very interesting in itself. Both select qualities that lend themselves to eulogy, but eulogy of very different kinds, so that these choices may be regarded as value preferences. Mr. Turner's truth is a "coherent system of pure principles," of which "only the meaner can be verified by reference to sensible facts." For James those "intellectual products

are most true which most successfully dip back into the finite stream of feeling, and grow most easily confluent with some particular wave or wavelet."

Mr. Turner is not unsympathetic in his treatment of pragmatism, but he has less patience with pluralism and radical empiricism. He thinks that a universe simply can not be pluralistic, and in his enthusiasm to maintain this view I believe he pays too little regard to the sense in which James held the universe might be pluralistic. He quotes with approval the statement that "reality is an experience-continuum," and sees in the word "continuum" the inevitable reversion to monism, especially since James also believes that our experience of the "visible world" and of the "spiritual universe" can be connected and continuous. "Can we imagine a wider and more direct contrast," he asks, "the world of sense and the world of the spirit—surely here, if anywhere, must we remain pluralists. On the contrary, however, James asserts these two worlds to be essentially one." Mr. Turner goes still further in his criticism. Ever since Kant "it has been an accepted principle of philosophy that our 'direct apprehension' of the universe is only possible through the work of thought." To say, therefore, that "reality is an experience-continuum" is not only to affirm that reality is monistic, but also to hold that it is an intelligible whole, penetrated through and through with thought and rationality.

Surely James is unfairly fettered here to the terminology of post-Kantian idealism. It is a fact that he repudiates "atomistic empiricism" and holds that "experience flows as if shot through with adjectives, and nouns, and prepositions, and conjunctions," but does he admit that these relations are the work of thought? Of course, they may be the work of what Kant called thought, but they certainly are not the products of intellect working in that capacity which results in the "vicious intellectualism" criticized by James. We must distinguish between a proper use of intelligence and this "vicious intellectualism," which James defines as "the treating of a name as excluding from the fact named what the name's definition fails positively to include." Mr. Turner well points out that James's over-enthusiastic language in his critique of intellectualism blurs the distinction considerably. For example, James criticizes thought for making motion unintelligible by defining it as "the occupancy of serially successive points of space at serially successive instants of time." Surely the trouble here is not with thought in general, but with a specific case of bad thinking giving rise to a bad definition. It is difficult on the basis of James's words to describe that proper use of thought which aids most in apprehending reality; certainly his

language is at times uncritical, and would imply that thought gave no clue to reality at all. But perhaps Mr. Turner errs by excess in the opposite direction when he argues that because the experience-continuum has relations in it, therefore it is a thoroughly rational and intelligible whole.

James affirmed that everything may be in a sense One, but denied that everything is significantly One in the sense taken by absolute idealism. "The world is One—yes, but how one," he asks. In his view all attempts to reduce everything to a single, self-consistent principle have had either of two consequences; the principle has left something unexplained, or else has been so vague and colorless as to be insignificant. There is either something outside the Absolute, or it is like an attic in which everything is simply there to be found. But why say an attic, why not "a perfect whole"? Why indeed? The eulogies upon the Absolute are the work of passion, and, as Hume said, "though we may enjoy the passions, they do not give us knowledge." James did not share this tender feeling for the Absolute, and he too judged things by the way they felt, interpreting the universe, as Professor Miller finely puts it, by its tertiary qualities.

Mr. Turner is grateful to James for having brought philosophy out of the study. He shows a fine appreciation of James's prejudices, which is remarkable in view of the fact that his own are apparently so different. His plea for the harmonious self-sufficiency of Mr. Bradley's metaphysics is persuasive because he offers it for what it is, and by the side of its very opposite. He "acquiesces in the opinion expressed by Mr. Bradley that James, with all his excellencies, was not primarily a metaphysician." The comment is true, if one believes in a "block-universe," such as makes Bradleian metaphysics appropriate. But William James did not believe in that kind of a universe, and therefore he was not that kind of a metaphysician.

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Æsthetics: A Critical Theory of Art. HENRY G. HARTMAN. Columbus, Ohio: R. G. Adams and Co. 1919. Pp. 250.

"Æsthetics as it exists to-day is a big name for ideas so anemic that I marvel at their longevity." So reflects Professor Hartman in this book which purports to offer a new and adequate method for esthetic theorizing. Nearly half of the volume amounts to an attack upon other men's methods and results; and it is this half that is unquestionably the abler. It is no new tactics for the writer upon